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Introduct i on.

.According to the present
from the nominal
lished

dissolution

of a

the actual

as distnrgithed

(o;poration,

mar be

accorvp

in four ways.

I

,xpiration

pv

of Charter.

II

F-r

the Voluntary

1I

PIT

a

-IV

"y

Re peal

b*

the Legislature.

The

law,

forfeiture

present

article

of

Surrender
of

its

of its

ranchises.

t"ranchises.

Charter when such power has

aeals

mainly with with

the

been reserved

first

two

of

these provisions.
PMr.
a more

Coo
in his
work on Stock and Stockholders
',makes
extended classification.
To wvn
1 FBT a forfeiture

of

its franchises by the adjudication of a court; 2 The loss
of its charter by a charter provision to that e~fect,in case
a corporation,
ce-tairi
thiryis within
a certain
time. 6 The
repeal of its charter under the reserved power of the State.
4
The voluntary surrender
of its
fraichises
by the stockhla
or 5 The expiration
of the time limited
for
its
existance
in
the charter.
: any authorities
add, at failure
of an
essential
part
of the corporate or ,anisati
on.
It
seerms that
divisions
one arid tro
of Mr. Cook's classification
may be
united,
for a failure
to perform a condition
annexed to the
charter , is a case for judicial fo-feiture.

is

It

impo-tarit

examination

ical

the

use
actual
o-

very

the

t,3-r
terrination

of the

at

in

extinguishment

two ways,

the leg-al
of

its

existance

franchises,

makiri,:

before

muaninw;
of a
and

crit-

a

the

that

to notice

authorities

"dissolution"
of

out set,

the

court
the

first,
corporation

in the

other

or

secondary sense the corporation may be '"issolvw& for the
purpoes of enforcing a statutorl, liability,

though the

cor0orate franchises may still exist.

The docto-ine of "th, failu-e of essential part" is
He calls our
acxredited to Chancellor VCllworth 1 fg. 590.
attention to a case I Roll.jAbr.514 (1) "-,here the corporatio
was composed of a certain number of brothers aid a certain
niumber oP sisters, and all the sisters "lure deau, anc it was
a*&s awrited that grants and acts done b- the two brothers
afterwards were void; for after the sisters were dead, it uwa
riot a perfict cor;0oration." Such a doctrine it seems is
entirely inapplicable to modern corporations having capital
stock The basis of membersbip being in these cases the holvof shares. 7 * c )

Abaient of Suits upon Dissolution.
The rule of the early common law, that all suits against
a person abate at the death of such person, has been applied in many cases by analogy to suits against corporations.
The rigor of the early common law was gradually modified,
and at the time when the corporation law came into prominance;

it was well settled that an action on contract,

involving a property right, could be revived and continued
against the executors and administrafors of the decedent,
after proper application to the court,
Substantially this practice is applied in corporation
law.

At the present time all actions involvi ng property

rights pending against corporations upon their dissolution;
may be revived and continued against the receiver or trustee.
But in some of the earlier cases this was not done.

The

cause of action was said to abate, they reasoned that as a\
deprived the corporation of its legal existance, a judgment
against it would be a mere nullity,

there being no person

against whom to enfotree it.(l)
(1)

Merritt v Suffolk Bk.31 Meo57;Terry v Merchants Bk.66

Ga

On the other hand it is equally well settled that at
conmmon law a tort action dies with the death of a person.
If we follow the analogy as before, we reach the conclusion
that all torts abate by the dissolution of the corporation.
The question is coming up under the statutes of this
State apparently for the first time, the effort to sustain
a tort action is based upon #8 of lR.S.600.

The statute is

as follows "Upon the dissolution of any corporation...the
directors of the affairs of such corporation at the time of
its dissolution, shall be trustees of the creditors and
stockholders of the dissolved corporation, and shall have
full power to settle the affairs of the corporation,
collect and pay the outstanding debts:

By Ch. 294 #4 of the

Lawsof 1832,such an action did not abate, this act was

repealed by the general repealing act of 1880 Ch. 245 #10
and in its place was enacted ##755-66 of the Code of Civil
Proceadure.
This question may be illustrated by the case of Hepworth
v Union Perry Co.0l)

Here an action was brought against a

common carrier for damages caused by an alleged assault and
battery committed upon plaintiff by defendant's servants

(1) 62 Hun 295;aff.131 N.Y.645,no opinion.

while the parties were at issue the charter of the defendant
company expired.

A motion was made to continue the action

against the trustees of the dissolved corporation.
Mr. Justice Barnard was of the opinion that the act of
1832 was dec4araLtory merely of the comtnon law, and that its
repeal did not effect or alter the inherent power of the
Court.

And also that Othe statute creditor 2nbraces those

persons whose claims are based on torts.

The lawsmakes the

directors trustees to settle the affairs of the corporation
Justice Cullen in a similar case says (1)

"The power

given to the trustees is 'to settle its affairs',is a term
comprehensive enough to include all liabilities:
argues that the ar6

He then

should recieve a liberal construction

with a view of aiding Justice.

Continuing he says,*It

would be inequitable to deprive the plaintiff of satisfactin
of his claimby the voluntary act of the real parties in
interest-the stockholders.

Lastly the action should be

continued under the provisions of the code, in as much as
the Oode is simply a revision of the former law, and a
a revision is presumed not to alter the existing law.
(1) Grafton v Union Ferry CO.19 Sup.966.

"I do not believe, says he, that it wqs the intention of tho
Legislature to abrogate the rule, but rather to substitute
the mode of proceeding for the revival of actions provided
for in the Code!
The other view is ably maintained by Justices Dykman and
Osborne.

The gist of their argument is that a person who

is injured by a tort is not a creditor until his damages
become liquidated... 'A cause of action for a tort is not an
indebtedness, and it would be contrary to all analogies of
the law to it so .. It requires a special statute to enable
actions for wrongs to the property rights or interests of
another to be maintained against the executor or adminis trator of the wrong doer:
I must leave this subject unsettled in thie State the

General Term having reached opposite conclusions.

As the

cases of McCulloch v Norwood (1) and Sturges v Vanderbilt

(2)went off on questions of practice.

The Court of Appeals

will be free to adopt either view. (3)

(1) McCulloch v Norwood 58N.Y,562.
(2) Sturges v Vanderbilt 73 N.Y.388.
(3) See also Blake v Portsmouth R.R.39 N.H.435where the statute provided for the continuance of all actions against
the corporation.

The Ways in which Dissolution may take

Place,

I By Expiration of Charter.
In this country it has been almost the universal practice
to charter business corporations, or corporations having a
capitol stock for a limited period of years; and upon the
conmaing of the date named in the charter for its expiration,
the corporation ipso facto ceased to ,exist.

This is well

stated by Mr. Justice Story in Greeley v Smith (1), the case
before him involved the construction of one of the charters

of a national bank, hi said, "Many of our banks are, by law
limited to a term of years for their corporate existence,

and if there is no saving when the term expires, the
corporation is de facto dead.'

And as the corporation is not in esse, no judicial
detarmination of its dissolution is necessary. IN Sturges v
Vanderbilt(2) it was argued that as to creditors a judici~l
uc*crrlnt~u: " '

"All

e.

av;Justice

:lapello

in, replv

i,

the cases cited in support of this proposition relate

to a dissolution in consequence

of insolvency,

(1) Greeley v Smith 3Story 657.
(2) Sturges v Vanderbilt 73 N.Y.388.

or nor-user,

or mis-user of the corporate franchises.

The principle

upon which th&A class of cases rests is not applicableto a

dissolution by expiration of the charter,

The dissolution

in such a case is rendered by act of the Legislature itself.
The limited time of existence has expired and no judicial
determination is requisite.

The corporation is de facto

dead.*
But when the continuance of the corporation beyomd a
fixed period is made to depend upon the performance of a

condition, the non-performance of the condition is a mere
ground of forfeiture.

The corporation still contimues to

exist unti declared dissolved by a proceeding to enforce
the forfeiture.*

ft

II

By the Voluntary Surender of its Franchises.
1

Abandmont of Sorporate Business with consent of

all the Stockholders.
Tt is an unguestioned rule, says Mr. Cook, that all the
stockholders ,by unamious consent, may effect a dissolution
of the corporation by the surender of the corporate
franchises

W' This proposition while it seems to be fundl-

mentally sound is difficult of application,and seems only to
arise in cases where the corporation has abandoned the
undertaking for which it was chartered.
The leading authority in this country is Slee vBloom (2)
where the court held in an opinion by Chiaf Justice Ipencer

overuling Chancellor Kent (3) that the corporation was
dissolved.

The Dutcher Cotton Mfg. was a duly organised

corporation existing under the laws of the State of New
York.

In February 1818 all the property of the corporation

was sold under executionthe corporatjon had totally ceased
doing business the preceeding December.

(1) Cook on Stock.#629
(2) Slee v Bloom 19 Johns.456.
(W)id 7 Johns Ch.376.

Bill was filed in

April

1S19 asking;

be dissolved,

for a decree declaring

the corporation

with a view of obtaining the enfozrserent

of thu stockholders liability under the statute.
says,

"Th.

to

The Ch. J.

-roundda, which I place my opinion, that the

corporation is dib solveo

is that they have done aid su_.u_.

ed to be done acts uquivcklent to a direct surender.
The Chancellor,

corieeds,

admit o " doubt,

that a corpor'ation may

surrender of all

rights ....
3_erin
and object

their

and it does not in roi judgment

corpo-ate

be di.solveci by a

i~ropertv

and corporate

an act to be done which destroys the end

"or which the corporation was institutea

must be equivolent to t

doing an act ,,rhich+roduces the

very same consequences,

surender is an act in pais; it

can,

therefore be no objection in this case, that the

acts wlhich have dissolved the corporation are acts in pais.i
In

'ikles v Pank of Rochester (1) the corporation had

ceased to do business for- over a year after the recovery
by the bank of a judgment and execution.

The bank had been

a stockholder in the "defunct" corporation. A bill was filed
in equity tO have the sale set aside, alleging that the
(1) I[ikles v Pank o-' Rochester

I11 h.11 .

corporation '-,as dlsslveci
the bank
oration.

, as

a tenant in

arid praying for an accounting
common

by

of the assatts of the corp-

Upon demurrer the court said"the stockholders of

a corporation ar

,either

tenants in

common of the corporateo-x

nor copartners either before or after its dissolution."
'urther illustrations are the cases of More v Whiticomb
and Penman v Friggs.

In the former the court held that a

failure to hold annual meetings

together with an abandonment

of a railroad for seven years, constituted a virtual
dissolution of the corporation.
formulated the rule

thus:

In the latter the court

If a corporation suffer acts

to

be done which destroy the end and object for which it was
instituted, it is equivolent to a surrender of its rights."

MToore v VWhiticomb 3 1,o.543
300;S.C.on appl.8 Cow.387.

and Penman v Priggs I Hop. Ch/

State must Accept Surrender of 'rarnchises.
On principle it would seem that although the corporation
has

abandouriu

still

its

enterprise

and is

de facto dead,

yet it

rureains a corporation de jure in esse until the acce

ceptance of its

franchise by the State.

For it has

been

held in the Darthmouth College case that a charter of a
corporation is a contract between the State and the
oration,

and if

so,

then it

corp-

is a term of that contract

that

thevcorporatorsiVill undertake to carry on the business for
which it was organised until the expiration of its charter,
or an acceptance by the State of its corporate franchises
relieving it

from so doing.

The Masschusetts Courts were

the first to recognise this principle, Justice Morton says(A
Charters are in many respects compacts between the Government and the corporators

and as the

former cannot deprive

the latter of their franchises in violation of the compact
without the consent of the forrme-...The surrender of a /can
only be made by some
(1) Boston Glass Co.

formal solemqact of the corporation
v Lang don 24 Pick.49.

arid will

be of no avail until

must be the same

agreement

form the compact.
to

There

accepted by the State
to dissolve,

that ther was to

Tt is the acceptance which gives efficacy

the surrender. "
A late

case

in

extent to which

the United States Supreme

the court will carry

-Justice JacksDn speaking forithe

Court shows the

this doctbrine;

court says,

(1)

Fr.

"The

aver-

ments that said corporation paid all other debts and
thereafter distributed their remaining assets among their
stockholders and have since no use of their franchises,
arid have no agents
served,

or officerskpon whom process has

and no assets out of which any judgment

tham could be satisfied, fall

been

against

far short of a dissolution

such as would prevent a suit against the corporation or
their trustees."
"A corporation is not dissolved
its

powers,rnor

consider it

(I)
(2)

because

to be

its

'defunct',,'

by ceasing to exercise

stockholders

amd directors may

(2).

Swan Land Co. v 7rank et al 13 Sup.
Rollins v Clary 33 .,e.136.

Ct.R.

691.

Fut flo one will deny that as private corporations uither of
those companies may abandon its charter and dissolve itsol,'
except so

far as its creditors may have a right to object,

and so far as its public duties as conservator's of a highwa,
mayf tend to limit its powers in this respect:

and the

(1)
Legislature ma,7,

at pleasure, release it from the limitation'

"It does not follow that a corporation is dissolved by
the

sale of its visible and tangeable property, for' the

payment of debts,

and by the temporary suspention of busi-

ness, so lon6 as it has the moral and legal capacity to;,Aekse
its subscriptions, call iii more capital
business."

and re-assume its

(2).

Where the Legislature provides that when certain corporations become insolvent, or where they ease:.tQ do business
for a certain time,
their charters.
tar +surender

a proceeding may be commenced to forfeit

Under these statutes it seems that a volune

by a

corporation of

its

franchises under such

circumstances works a dissolution of their corporate exis*-)

erce.

And says

the Vermont court

(3) "It is quite probable

(I) Lauman v Lebanon Valley R?R? 30 Pa. St.42.
(2) Brunkichoff v Frown 7 Johns. Ch.217.
(3) Brandon Iron Co. v Gleason 24 Vt 28.

surrender may be presumed where

that a lagal

length oF' timu

there

for a s ifficent

has existed an entire non-user of corpe

orate franchises."
2any of thu courts insist that the surrender of the
franchises of a

corporatlon mustbe judicially determined

an action brought

for this purpose,

determined the corporation is du jure
tion may by

virtue of proceedings

cal

purposes,

and that until so
in

esse.

against

cease

of its pecuniary conditions,

but it

it,

to exist

for which it was cr ated or

corporation may exist,

in

"A

corpora-

or by reason

fo-

all practi-

for 'which'¢ a
be

cannot be held tOA actually

dissolved till sb

adjudged and determined either by judici-

al sentence or by

the

soverign power...It may

its vitality suspended - as perhaps the
corporate powers,

but

proceeded against

by action, for

action is available
This

is

(1)
(2)

capital

Genesee

of

be liable

any purpose

12)

and

As decided
The

corporation1

court

corporate legal

Kincaid v Divinelle 59 N.Y.551.
Iages v Genesee Acad. 17 N.Y.St.RA423.

be

sue."(1)

charitable
by the

to

for which an

any one having a right to

stock.

Academy

exercise

it may nevertheless

equally true of religeous

having no
v The

to

be dormant

in Magee

existeace

continues although it has ceased to exist for all 4ducational purposes,
by its
until

and no longer ex(.rcises

charter .
so adjudged

the powers

conferred

Acorporation cant bc held to bu dissolved
.

(i).

But a stockholdk

mair b.

cstopped

from denying thu corporate existance, by actually parti.cipating

in

the distribution

It seems that the contra,

of Thu

corporate

assets.

is the Alabama rule *th1 e court

held that proceedings under th6

statute were urnecessary,

saying that

1h4 corporation could waivu a statuto-y p-ocuud-

ing einacted

for its

benefit.

(2).

But for the purpose of aiding creditors)i"

thei-

-ffort

to obtain satisfaction of their dabts thL corporation may
be considered dissolved.
Co.

(6)the

In Agricultural Association v In

corporation was insolvent

the coutt aaid

"for all practical purposes, as to creditors it
within the meaning of the statute.

was dissolvd

Any other doctrrinv

would be unreasonable, and would render the

the statute,

and the liability it imposes, incapable of affording the
creditor of the corporation the benefit and sacaitv
intended. "

"The

.

courts of this State consider that for

(1) Applied in Fradt v Penedict 17 N.Y.93.
(2) Savage v WalsQ 26 Ala.(319. See also 1,obile R.R.
29 Ala. 573.6
Coal
CO v R. R. 4G&J. (md. ) I pAll-2.
(3)
Agr. Ass. v Ins.CO/ 70 AIl .I1O.

v State

the remedy against thu individual member, and in favor of
creditors a virtual surrwnder of the corporate -ights,and
a dissolution of the corporation may be presumed from a
transfer of all its assets,

and other circumstances

which

would not ordinarily create a dissolution per se."(1).
Two other cases illustrate the application of this rule,
Hollingshead v Woodard

(2) and Farmer Bank v Gallaher. (3)

in the former the court said that the statute of limitation
bean

to run from the date of the abandonment.

And in

the latter the creditor was allowed to proceed against a
stockholder of the "defunct" corporation;
issued at an overvaluation.
in

either

case."

the stock was

No dissolution had taken place

(4)

(i)
Kelhor v Lodeman 11 Mo.Appl.550.
Other illustrations
are Slec v BlooM, Penman v Briggs, and Brurikichoff v
Benedict all cited supra.
(2) Hollingshead v Woodard 107 N.Y.96.
(3) -Parmer Bk. v Gallaher 53 M'o. Appl.482.
(4)See also Bk.of ?oughpei pee v Oboston 24 Wend.479;
Wait or Insolv. Corp. #345.

'ailurw
Whar

to

'ile

-n abantlment

no assets.

Annual

Reports.

takes placu

and the

corporation has

The t,,ndency of the mociern cases is to hold that

the corporation is so far dissolved as to relieve
trustees from the

the

statutory liability of filing annual

reports. The reason being thet the statute

is penal in its

operation and should be strictly construed. (I)

So where

a receiver has been appointed and the property is in the
possession of the Court.

(L)

But where there are still assets,

and the trustees are

in active possession of the assets of the company they are
bound to account.

(3)

Bruce v Olatt 80 N.Y.379; and Van Arnburgh v Baker
81 N.Y.46.
(2) Huguenot v Sthdwelle 74 N.Y.621.
(3) Sanborn v Lefferts 58 N.Y.621.
(1)

II Py Acts of the Majority Stockholdurs.
The solution of thu question presented, whether the
majority of the stockholders of a corporation can declare
and enfource
of statute;

a dissolution of thu

corporation

in

the

absence

takes us back to the fundimental principles of

corporation law.

On the one hand it is

argued that a

corporation is essentially a co-partnership organised under
special laws, for the purpose of getting a limited shareholders liability.

That its members delegate their power

to act to agents appointed by them,and that within the
scope of theirfbusiness~the act of the majority stockholders
acting in good faith are binding upon the minority;

as a

single member of a co-partnership can terminate the corporate relation so the majority of the stockholders can terminate the

corporate relation, save only when prevented by the

statute.
Upon the other hand it is argued that a corporation ia
not in

its

nature

like a partnership,

but is

an artificial

person recognised by the law and created by statute for the

purpose of accomplishing certain things, and that its
stockholders are only a means to aid this creature of the
law in carrying out the object for which the law incorporatd
it.

While it is true that the will of the majority express

es the will of the corporation, this will is

intended to

aid and further the corporate being, and can not be extended to destroy the

being it is desined to aid

Having now a general
argument proceeds:

idea of the thoery upon which the

I will take up the cases, examing those

first which hold that the majority of the stockholders
have such power.
The earliest case to treat of this subject
The Society ofi Attorneys.

(1)

is Ward v

The question was presented

by an application to the~ourt for an injunction restraining
the majority of the members of the society from surrendering their charter to the Kind with a view of obtaining
another allowing them to accumulate a library.
refused to grant the

The court

injzction, but saying that they would

reserve the merits until a final hearing.
(i) Ward v The Society of Attys. 1 Coll.

(7ng. ) 370.

This case is followed by Treadwell v Salisbury Nlfg. Co. (1)
where the court after daciding the case on a jurisdictionel
question say, "But we entertain no doubt of thu right of a
corporation, established solely "or trading and manufacturing purposes, by a vote of the majority of their stock-

holders , to wind up their business, if in the exercise of
a sound business discretion they deem it exptdierit so to do/
not
..If this be~sowe d6 not see that any limit could be put
to the business of a trading corporation short of the
entire loss or destruction of the corporate property.
The stockholder~s would be compelled to carry it on until
it came to actual insolvency.

Such a doctbrine is without

any support in reason or authority."
"Becoming incorporated

for a specified object without

any specifie4 time for its continuance of the business is
no contract to continue it for ever, any more than articles
of partnership without stipulation as to time.

There is no

reason why it should be construed into such a contract;
such is not implied by the

charter, and a doctorine that all

the stockholders but one may be compelled to continue a

-----

---------------------------

(i) Treadwell v Salisbury

f

Tg.

Co.7 Grey 393,404.

business which they find undesirable and unprofitable,
and wish to abandon, is so unreasonable and unjust that it

is not held to rise Ly implication, unless that implication is a mecessaryvone."

(i)

In this case,"The majority

of the corporators undertake a charter which specifies no
definate time

for its continuance, have a right to abandon

the undertaking, and dispose of and divide the property,
the proceeding in this case is valid as against the
complainents as a lawful way of accomplishing that end
Or to say the same thing in another way,

as to themn1(I)

"It is within the power of the stockholders to make the sale
of the assets of the
business."

corporation doing an unsuccessful and,

(2 and 3).

The New York Rule.

The comtrary doctorine is held in New York, Lousianna and
(4)
West Virginia.
In Abbott v The American Rubber "o.
(1) Black v Del.

Canal Co.22 N.J.7q.405-15.

(2) Bery v Broach ( SV. (Miss. )117.
(6) See also Wilson v Central Pridgu Co.9%T.i.J79,3: Peo. v
C-llege of Pal. 38 Cal.166,where this doctorine was extended to religeous and charitable corps. in Hands v Holdbrook
9 77ed.351
similar transfe- held valid.
(4) Abbott v Ruober Co.33 Parb.578. In La. Curien v Sentini
16 La. An.27;7olar Star v P.S. 16 id.76. Hurst v Cox 3 seep.
(W.V a. ) 564.

Justice Southerland delivered the opinion of the court;
"I do riot think

the directors,

even with the consent

of a

majority of the stochholders, had a right as against
stockholders not consenting, to discontinue its existance
and defeat the object of the organisation. 1 cannot presume
that the directors or a majority of the stockholders of
this corporation had a right by bhe laws of Corinectcuit by a
voluntary sale,

to discontinue its existance, wind up and

defeat the purpose, object and business for which the
corporation was organised, even with the consent of a
majority of the stockholders, so as to bind the minority
not consenting, would be in effect depriving them of their
property without their consent.'
In Ward v Sae Ins.

Co.

(1) the court denied the right

of the stockholders to dissolve the corporation saying,
"7either were the directors of the corporatioleven with the
assent of the stockholders, authorised to discontinue their
corporate business and wind up the affairs of the
or to distribute the

corporatin

capital of the concern among the

stockholders unless by authority of a special statute,or
(1) Ward v

Sea Insurance Co.

7 Pg.244.

under the decree od the Court declaring a dissolution. "
In this case
officers,

the Court siezcd upon their failure tolelect

and upon this ground declared a

forfeiture

and

appointed a receiver of their property.

Under the New York Statute.

The law :n New York has since

been changed by the Code of

Civil Proceodure H2419-21, providing that when a majority
of the directors desuver that the property of the corporation is not sufficent to pay its debts or "i- for any
reason they deem it beneficial to the interests of the
stockholders that the

corporation should be dissolved, thay

may present a petition"
This statute has

to the

been liberally construed to)ds the

furtherance of justice.
Appeals,

Court praying for a dissolmti6 .

In a late case in the Court of

Second Pivison. (i)

Justice

Varnholding

that right

of granting a dissolution is discretionary with the Court,
assuming of coarse

(~T

ijich.v
ortar1o

thatstatutory

proceeding has beehfolloweQCz)

twley 132 i.Y. 212.
vOrnorndaga Bk.7 Hun 549;

29 Hun 429; Re
Bk. 17 Pac.272.

Re Pvrrolusite

Boynton Saw Co.34 Hun 669; Jurs

Co.

v Leadville

Assignment for Penefit o," Creditors.
Tt seems to be well settled that at Common Law a corporation car

make

an assignrmcnt

for thc benefit

of creditors.

Cv'
A private person acting in good faith is allowed to pay hisA
in any way he pleases so long as he devotes his entire
property to the payment of his creditors.
should be allowed to do

A corporation

The management of the

the same.

business is vested in the directors, who while acting in
good faith and within the scope of the business, have entire
control of the managemert of the
of debts

is

corporation.

but an incident of the businessarly

The payment
doctvrine

which restricts this right, interfer% with the directors
power to rmanage its business.

An assignment for benefit

of creditors is a mode of marshalling the

corporate assets

for the payment of debts, and on principle should be
allowed. (1) Arecent case in the Court of Appeals takes this
viewsthey say

(2) "Regarding the transaction...as a simple

preference of one creditor of the corporation,
(1) Ilyman v Perry 3 Wash St. 734;
(2) Coats v Donell 94H.Y. 168,78.

do not

Haxtum v Pishop 3 Wend.13

understand that such preference

is unlawful.

The right of a failing debtor to prefer one creditor to
another in the distribution of his property, while it is
often regretted, is recognised both in law and equity.
A corporation in this respect stands the same right as an
individual. Tt may execute a mortgage or give

a lien which

shall operate as a preferance, unlessed restrained by statute."

The rule applies equally well to a religeouv or

charitable corporation. (i)

Under the New York Statute.

Pecause of the great practical importance of the right of a
corporation in the State of New York to make an assignment
for the benefit of creditorsI

I will give a brief hisrory

of the statutory law in this State.
The first statute requiring attentiorn is Ch.325 of the
Laws of 1825;1 R/S.603,4 prohibited assignments by corporations actually insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency
to any officer or stockholder of said company either directly or indirectly.

Put k4 did "not apply/to any incorporated

(i) De Ryter v St. Peters

Church 3 N.Y.239.

libiary

or relierious

society;

nor to ani monied corporation

which shall have been created ,or whosecharter shall have
been renewed after the first of January 1128.
In

"

(1)

1882 the above section was repealed by Ch.402 739 nd

7i2187 of Ch.409 was put in its place.

This section prohibitd

assignments to officers and stockholders,and prohibited the
giving of preferences by monied corporations.
the Laws of 1882 was in
of 1884.

turn amended by Ch.

But #39

of

434 of the Laws

Thus restoring it to its origemaj standing as givn

above.
To surnerise, at common law corporations could make general assignments.

Under the law of 1825, all domestic (2)

corporations except monied or religious and charitable, were
prohibited from making assignments to officers or stockholders.

From 1882-1884 the former provision was made applicable

to monied corporations and removed as to all others.
In

1884 the origenal provision was restored leaving unalt-

ered the inhibition against monied corporations.
This remained the law down to l,9O when all former provisions were repialed.

The present law may be found in -748 of

(1) Vol.1 R.S. #11 star pg. 605.
(2) Coats v Donell 94 N.Y.p.178.

the Stock Corporation law. (I)

Under this section transfers

by corporations whey

to any of its

stockholders

are

insolvent

prohibited.

Put assignments may be made

third persons provided no pro~ences
But when made

officers or

by any corporation

are

subject

in, any Acreated.
to the

to
(2)

banking law

the transfer must be authorisect by a previously passed
resolution of

its

Poard of Directors, providing the property

transferred exceeds

in

valueRlOOO.

(8ed.) 4102.
(1) L. '92 Ch.688;5N.Y.R.S.
(2) In Crompton v Miller 19 Sup.691 the attention
of the
court was not called to the late
statutory changes.

III

By act of' the Legislature

Declaring Corporation

Pissolved.
Ordinarily the repeal of the charter of a corporation by
the Legislature

ix

dissolution so far as the

an involuntary

directors arid stockholders ofi the corporation are concerned,
but

it is possible that

the directors and stockholders may

petition the Legislature to dissolve the corporation.
A repeal of a charter brought about in this waV would be
within the domain of this thesis.
Since the decision of' the United States Supreme Court in
the Darthmouth College case the Legislatures of the various
States have been careful to reserve

the right to repeal or

modify all charters granted to corporations.

So that in

the cases we are to discuss, the contract obligation
be ween the State and the corporation is not
"A repeal of a charter, sa

Mr. Justice Blatcheord,
%s

does not of itself violate or impair
contract which the

involved.
(I)

thulvalidity of any

corporation has entered into.

But the Legislature cannot establish such rules in regard
to

the management and dispotioni of the assets of the corp-

(Lathrop, vStedaz 13'Elatch.143.v

,

oration, that the avails shall be diverted from, or divided
unfairly or unequally among,

the creditors,

and thus irnPair

the obligation of contracts, or that the portion of the
avails which belong to the stockholder shall be sequestrated
and diverted from the owners, and thus injure vested rights/
The Legislature has the right, as an administrative measure,
to appoint a trustee, to take the assets and manage the
affairs of a corporation whose charter has been repealud. "
Upon the repeal of a charter by the Legislature acting
within the limits of its constitutional authority, the
corporation ceases to exist, and no judgment can be rendered
against it

in

an action at law.(Fecause

there is

no person

in esse against whom the judgment could be enfuorced ).
Sach a repual does not impair the obligation of contracts
made by the corporation with other parties during its
existtnce."

(1)

7or while It 4s true that"if several men

enter into a valid contract,

it

cannot be altered fundiment-

ally but by the unavipous consent. " (2)
(1)
(2)

Thorton v Marginal rreLght Co.2'3
Merve-y v mid. R.R. 4 Piss.78.

Yet "Aorporation
Mass.32.

by the very terms and nature of its political existunce
is

subject

to ,

to dissolution."

nderstand the nature

politic

"1ve-ri-cedito-

must be pr-sumed

and incidents of such a body

, and to contract with reference to them.

(1)

It can rake no difference that those dealing with it
could not forsee"its future dissolution. (2)

------------------------------------v ?otornac R.R. 8 Pet.282, p.2S7.
Ala.573,36; See also
(2)1:obile Ry. v Peo.21
Boston Copper Co. 15 Pic.351.

Revere v

1'.,

Dissolution

There

is

ir

Legislature
f'urin-

Autho-ised

most States

for the

New York,added a
proceedings

ii

I

Py

Statutory-

II

Ty

a

III

by

IV Fy
V

fifth.

the

EY.actmeit.

four methods prescribed

volunta-v

the present winite-

byf Legislativu

dissolution

of

b,r the

corporations.

the Legislature of the State of No
1will

very briefly

following

order.

Proceding

in Court.

outline

these

Re-organisation.
Re-incorporation.

Consolidation.

By the Sale of Entire Busimess

to AnotherCorporation.

I
I

By Statutory Procedings

in Court.
#l2419-&,o1
ovides that

The Code of Civil Procudure

if a majority of the directors having having in charge

the

management of a corporation created by or under the laws
of the State discover that the corporation is insolvent;
or if

for any reason they deem it beneficial to the

inter-

ists of the stockholders that the corporation be dissolved
they ma* present a verified petition to the court p-aying
for a dissolution under the order of' +he court.
Upon the receipt of the petition the court makes an
order requiring all persons

interested ixn the corporation to

show cause before a referee why the
be dissolved.
may upon notice
eiver, who

If the

corporation should not

corporation be insolvent, the court

to the Atty.Gen.

appoint a temporary

takes charge of all the assets

hearing the court may or may not: in

its

final order dissolving, the corporation.

.

Upon the

recfinal

discretion make

a

The receiver then

will collect and distribute its effectslpro rata, among the
creditors, and the balanceif
stockholders.

any,

pro rata among the

II By Re-incorporation.

Fy 1,32

of the General

Corporation La-7 it

is

provided

any domestic corporationg at any time within three
before

its

expiration

existancelbeyond

the

thereof,

that

rears

rmay bztend the term of its

time specified in its original certifi-

cate of incorporation, by the consent of the stockholders
owning two-thirds of its

capital stock,or if not a corpora-

tion having capital stock, by the
its members...Upon filing

consent of two thirds of

and recording

'

such certificate

the corporation will be revived and extended, for a term
not excediwv- the tern of which it was incorporated in the
first

instance.

II By Re-organization

When, thi

property and franchises of a domestic corporatin-M

are sold by virtue of a mortgage o
to the judgment of a court

eed of trust, pursuant

'The purchaser may associate

irih

with hin any rnumer of persons, not less than the number
required by law for the incorporation of such corporations,
a majority of whom shall be citizens of trie State, may
become a corporation, and take and possess the property anid
franchises thus
ation.

sold, upon filing a certificate of incorpor-

(1)

(1) Stock Corporation La,!

.

IV

By Consolidation.

The best illustration of the effect of consolidation of
corporations is to be found in what are

termed railroads-

Vie have here to deal with the legal status of the corporatinn
before arid after consolidation,and the relation of thes
consolidated company to the creditorsof the old company.
Substantially tho same phenomineais presented here

, as in

all other cases of combination, so I will treat it but once.
I,r.

Justice Strong in delivering the opinion of the

Supreme Court in Railroad Co.v Georgia

(1)said "The effect

of consolidation, as distinguished from a union by. merger
of one company into another, is to work a dissolutior
companies

consolidating, and to create a new corporation

out of the former one.'

In each case before it took place

the original companies existed and were
other,.

of the

irid-pedant of each

It could not occur without their consent.

The consolidated company then had no legal existance.
It could have none while the origenal corporation subsisted
All-the old and the new could not co-exist.
-r.Co. v Georgia 98 U.S.p.363.

It was a can-

±1/

preceaent to the exist-ence of the new corporation

dition

that the old one should first
submit to dissolution ...

ed,

Whex

surrender their validity and
the

consolidation ",as complet-

the old companies verdestroyed,

and its powers were
franchises
As

-ranteA to it."

a new one was created
It

has new powers, now

and new stockholders. "(L)

far as the creditors of one of the original companies

is concerned, the consolidated company is the successor of
the old cornpair,

it

is

a nevr and ind-#penderit company,

such creditor has no claim against
contract;

it upon their

original

but only by virtue of' its assumption of the

obligations of the old companies."(')

(L)
(2)

and

Pulman Car Co. v iMo. Pacific Co. 115 U.S.94.
Boardman v Lake Shore 84 N.Y.181.

V

By Sale of Franchises and Property.

Any stock corporation (except a railroad corporation)
may sell with the consent of 2A4 of its stockholders,its
entire property, and franchises, or any part thereof to any
domestic corporation engaged in the same business of the
same general character.

Such sale shall shall vest the

rights and franchises thereby conferred in the corporation 4
to which they were conveyed.

(1) Stock Corporation Law #33;

(1)

as amended L.'93 Ch.638.

The Effect of Dissulution Uporn the Corporate Prop'ty
I

As to Realty.

Under the common law, all the realestate owned by the
corporation at the date of the dissolution,and undisposed
0-

- reverted to the grantor and his heirs.

of Chancellor Kent,

Tn the words

(1) "According to the well settled law

of the land, where there is no special statute providing to
the contrary, upon the civil death of a corporation, all its
real estate,remaining unsold, reverts to the origonal
grantor and his heirs."

"For the reversion, in such an

event, is a condition annexed by law,
cause of the grant has failed."
Equity;
light.

ni as much as the

(2)

however, views the matter in quite a different

In equity the corporation is rugarded as a trustee

holding the corporate property for the benefit of its
creditors and stockholders, which, upon its dissolution or
civil death, a court of Chancery will lay hold of as a trust
(1) 2 Kent
Com.307.
(2) Ang. & Am. on Corp. #77 .

fund,

arid dis T- b"

law rule isr

PIr

ecognised in

h,

b r, fit."

New York

case of Fringham v Weidereaux .

(1)

as late

(2)

The common

as 184i) in

the

This doctvrine receiv-

ed its death blow at the hands of Justice Rapello

in the

case of Heath v Parmore !50 N.Y.305where he holds that the
common law rule does not prevail in respect to stock
corporations.

At the present time it seems fair to.say that

the rule has either been changed by statute, or by judicial
construction in most if not all the states,

so far as it

applies to business corporations having capital stock.
But when

dealing with corporations having no stockholder4

organised other than for pecuniary bfnefit, we must follow
and apply the commom law.
in

the

case of Mottv Dansville

they say that
and changed
lative

The Supreme Court of Illinois

in

"The

(3)

took this

view,;

rule of the common law has been modified

modern times by courts

enactments.

grown upavor~of

Seminary

Such modifications
corporations

of equity

and Legis-

and changes

organised

(l)Fringham v Weidereaux I N.Y.509.
vTPasset 102 ill.323;See
Life Ins *Co.
(2)
Robinson 20 7la. 352.
(3) Nott v Dansville Sem.i2lA 111.403.

have

for pecuniary

also

How v

profit.

In regard to the latter the shareholders are

themselves the origirnal donors of the corporate property
each member contributing his share of the capital
common benefit of all;

for the

arid the corporation so long as it

L-

solvent, holds the property given it merely as trustee for
its shareholders..,

7nigland the doctrine that the

in

real estate owned by a corporation reverts to the origonal
owmer upor, dissolution,
eccltsAtical

was first

applied in case

andiunicipal corporations.

of

The main reason

for such was that in those cases, there waeno shareholders,
and ordinarily no creditors, so thak the property was really
without an owner after the particular use, for which it had
had come to an exd by a dissolution of the

been given,
corporate

body.

These reasons,

Which gave

rise

to the doct-ineand

originally justified its application, existed in the case
of the Dansville Seminary at the time when
took place.

its

dissolution

It is the equity in favor of creditors and

shareholders, which prevents the enforsement of the rule,
when it is not follo,ed.

No such equity exists

in

this

case... Ev terms of the charter there were to be no stock-

holders,

and it was evidently contemplated, that tht instit-

ution of learning herein provided
and supported

by gifts

for would be organised

and donations./..In

statutory regulations to the contrary,
rcvorter to the origuina

the absencu of
the doctrine of

or his heirs in case of corporate

dissolution is applicable, at this day, to public and
eleemosrriary

corporations,

even in

the view of a court of

equity.
In orde- to determine the law of thie State a detaLed
examination of the statutes

is

necessary.

Put ]r

general

it may be said(the statutes have provided that the property
of all churches and religeous societies shall upon the
extirnctiorn or abandonment of

the

same,

vest

in

the trustees

of said corporationand after the payment of all existing
debts,

the balamce,

if

any, shall be turned over to the

governing board of the demonination to which the extinct
church belonged.

(I)

It is provided by statute that the property of all
educational corporations shall be distributed by the
(I)
See 3,. Y. R. S. 1906-8,11P-19 and *73 of proposed
Religeous Corp. Law; Tcport of Stat. Rev. Com. '90 p1381-1

9

21.

Regents

o"

the University of th

ways as

they deem just

State

o0

ilew York

'n such

and equitable. (I)

So far as I have carried my
unable to

.

investigation,

I have

been

find general laws applicable to hospitals,

Volunteer Fire Depts. and other similar non-membership
corporations.

In which case,

to the contrary),

it

(rio special charter provision

would follow that the real

estate would

revert to the grantor and the personalty to the State.

(1)

Laws

of

'92

Ch. 378

630;

5 R.S. (Red. )3540.

II

As

to Personalty.

As to personalty, the rules of the

common law provided

that upon the corporate dissolution the property reverts to
the State.

And under the circumstances.as given above, the

personalty of a dissolved corporation will revert to the r",
State.

Two recent cases have aris .n involving the distribution
of the property of Mutual Insurance companies, they are
Titcomb v YJennebank vutual Ins.
Ins.

Co.

(2)

Co.

(i) and The Traders

In the former the Supreme

Court of Maine

ordered the assets turnedover to the treasurer of the State;
on the following reasoning "It

is

said that in this class

of cases the corporation named in the act of incorporation
should be regarded as

stockholders.

They are not

stockholders/ and to hold that they are would be a fiction
there

is no equity in favor of thecorporators of a mutual

insurance company.
(1)
(1)

They contribute nothing towards

Titcomb v Yeenebick Mutual ins. 7 MLe.315.
Traders Ins .Co. v Brown 142 MTass.403.

its

,

its assets, and we think that it would be contrary to public
policy to allow them to have a pecuniary interust

in them..

We think there is a much stronger equitir in favor of the
former policy holders, whose money contributed to produce
assets.

Put as they aant be regarded as stockholders after

their policies have expired and their previous rotes been
cancelled and given up.

They have received the benefits

in full for which they contracted and are no longer before
members of the company. "
In the later case, the Massachusetts coutr after a careful examination of their statute,held that in as much as
the promoters of the company had invested their capital
as a guarinty

fund, which fund was liable for te company,

they should be allowed to share the profits arid so ordered
the property to be distribted.

